International Bulletin of Political
Psychology
Volume 4

Issue 12

Article 5

3-27-1998

Trends. France and the National Front: The Psychology of
Fanaticism
IBPP Editor
bloomr@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Other Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Editor, IBPP (1998) "Trends. France and the National Front: The Psychology of Fanaticism," International
Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 4 : Iss. 12 , Article 5.
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol4/iss12/5

This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Editor: Trends. France and the National Front: The Psychology of Fanaticism

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
Title: Trends. France and the National Front: The Psychology of Fanaticism
Author: Editor
Volume: 4
Issue: 12
Date: 1998-03-27
Keywords: Fanaticism, France, National Front
As this Issue of IBPP is being readied for posting, there is significant controversy in France over the
political viability and morality of conservative politicians accepting support from the far-right National
Front in regional assemblies. President Jacques Chirac, France's President, has strongly attacked
accepting such support and has derogatorily termed the National Front's leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, a
fanatic.
Whatever one might think about the charges of racism, national chauvinism, and xenophobia against
the National Front, one should pause when considering the fanatic label. Often the term denotes
excessive zeal and irrational attachment to a cause. Yet it is most often used towards people with whom
one very strongly and substantively disagrees--as if some mild to moderate degree of divergence of
substantive opinion, as opposed to means of implementation, may be grudgingly tolerated, but no more
than that. And as if people with whom one agrees are less likely fanatics. This seems to especially be the
case, since the descriptor irrational is less often employed to denote a significant disparity from
normative reason and logic and more often employed to suggest a very strong difference of opinion at
times linked with a hyper-reason and hyper-logic.
In any event, a significant implication and problem with the fanaticism term is the suggestion that there
may be no opinions, beliefs, values, goals, and acts worth defending or attempting to achieve by all
means necessary. Is this so? Should this be so? Are examples of fanaticism throughout history nothing
more than oppositional counterpoints to what is now termed postmodernism?
There may be many appropriate verbal approaches in an attack on the French far-right. Fanaticism may
even service these attacks, not constitute them. (See Mead, M. (1977). Fanaticism: The panhuman
disorder. Etc., 34, 35-58; Milgram, S. (1977). The social meaning of fanaticism. Etc., 34, 58-61; Whitney,
C.R. (March 25, 1998). Chirac puts regional allies on the spot. The New York Times, p. A9.) (Keywords:
Fanaticism, France, National Front.)
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